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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the properties and determinants of managers’ multi-year financial forecasts.  
We ask whether, by how much, and why biases in managers’ forecasts of revenues, expenses and 
profits depend on the forecasting horizon and the verifiability of firms’ assets.  Since public 
companies rarely divulge their internal multi-year financial projections to outsiders, we use the 
one- to five-year-ahead management forecasts reported by private venture-backed firms.  We 
also introduce a new method of measuring financial forecast bias that compares forecasts to 
historically-grounded conditional projections, rather than to ex-post actuals.  We find that on 
average, managers’ forecasts of firm profitability and revenues are optimistic, especially as the 
forecast horizon increases to five-years-ahead.  Managers’ expense forecasts become more 
pessimistic as the forecast horizon rises, most likely arising from the need on managers’ part to 
respect ‘reasonable’ relations between revenues and expenses.  We conclude that profitability 
forecasts contain a strategic component, in that: [1] One-year-ahead revenue (expense) forecasts 
are slightly and asymmetrically pessimistic (optimistic), and five-year-ahead forecasts are hugely 
and asymmetrically optimistic (pessimistic); and [2] Biases in revenue and expense forecasts are 
larger the harder to verify or more intangible-intensive are firms’ assets. 
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1. Introduction and Summary 
 
Managers create and use multi-year financial forecasts for a wide variety of operating, 
investing, financing, accounting, budgeting, control, governance, compensation, and valuation 
purposes.  Developing multi-year financial forecasts is therefore a highly pervasive and 
important managerial task.  In this paper, we explore the properties and determinants of 
managers’ multi-year financial forecasts.  We particularly ask whether, by how much, and why 
any biases in managers’ multi-year forecasts of revenues, expenses and profitability depend on 
the length of the forecasting horizon, and the verifiability of forecasting firms’ economic assets.   
To date, the rich extant literature on management forecasts has almost exclusively 
focused on short-term forecasts.  This is because despite safe-harbor-type provisions, publicly 
traded companies rarely inform outsiders of their internal expectations more than one or two 
years into the future.  We seek to tackle this problem by using financial forecasts that are 
disclosed voluntarily by private U.S. firms to VentureOne, a leading provider of data to venture 
capital funds.1  While this markedly limits the generalizability of our results, and creates several 
methodological risks, our study provides the first large-sample evidence as to the properties of 
managers’ multi-year, long-term revenue, expense and net income forecasts.  As such, we add to 
both the well-established literature that has studied financial forecasts made by management 
(e.g., Patell, 1976; Penman, 1980; Waymire, 1984; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Miller, 2002; Hutton, 
Miller and Skinner, 2003; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Wasley and Wu, 2006), and the emerging 
literature on management earnings guidance (Brown and Higgins, 2005; Hutton, 2005). 
We also introduce an alternative method for measuring the biases in financial forecasts.  
In contrast to prior work, our method centers on comparing managers’ forecasts with what would 
be expected given the historical performance of firms as a whole, as well as conditioning on key 
characteristics of the firm itself.  We refer to these benchmark forecasts as historically-grounded 
conditional projections, or ‘historical projections’ for short.  We use the historical projection 
approach because VentureOne’s database does not report ex post actuals that can be matched 
against managers’ forecasts.  The approach was first used in labor economics to investigate 
issues of alleged pay discrimination against minorities (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973).  Although 
                                                 
1 We recognize that the paucity of management forecasts beyond one or two years into the future is not limited to 
financial forecasts.  As such, the fact that publicly traded firms voluntarily provide only short-horizon forecasts 
affects literatures other than accounting—e.g., economics, marketing and operations. 
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our application of the method places high inferential weight on accurately modeling firms’ 
historical financial performance, the method has particular promise for evaluating the degree of 
bias in long-term forecasts made by young companies.  This is because requiring there be long-
term ex post actual results to compare against long-term forecasts would for young firms 
substantially reduce the number of available observations.  Also, young companies such as those 
financed by venture capital face big going-concern risks, or the possibility of exit as a trade sale, 
and therefore and may well not survive as an independent company five years into the future. 
We analyze the large set of management financial forecast errors generated through the 
use of the historically-grounded conditional projection method in two main ways. 
First, we document whether and how the signs and magnitudes of management forecast 
biases vary as a function of the length of the forecasting horizon.  Prior work in entrepreneurship 
has argued theoretically, and concluded empirically, that entrepreneurs are hard-wired to be 
highly optimistic and risk seeking (e.g., Simon, Houghton and Aquino, 1999; Rigotti, Ryan and 
Vaithianathan, 2003; Landier and Thesmar, 2004; Puri and Robinson, 2005; Lowe and Ziedonis, 
2006).  This leads us to make the introductory prediction that if the managers making the 
forecasts provided by firms to VentureOne are similarly driven by hard-wired behaviorally-based 
optimism, and only by hard-wired behaviorally-based optimism, then those managers’ forecasts 
of revenues, expenses and profitability will be optimistic at all forecasting horizons, equally 
present for all kinds of firms, and increase as the length of the forecasting horizon increases. 
Empirically, we do find that for the pooled sample of firms, managers’ profitability 
forecasts are significantly and increasingly optimistic as the forecasting horizon rises from one- 
to five-years-ahead.  Managers make one-year-ahead forecasts of profitability (defined as 
managers’ forecasts of net income less historically projected net income, scaled by historically 
projected revenues) that are on average 35% too high.  This bias rises monotonically such that 
three- and five-year-ahead forecasts of profitability are 67% and 122% too high, respectively.   
However, we do not find that optimism is invariably present in the revenue and expense 
components of managers’ profit forecasts.  Specifically, we show that one-year-ahead revenue 
forecasts are on average reliably understated (pessimistic) by 11%, and three- through five-year-
ahead expense forecasts are reliably overstated (pessimistic) by 25%, 41% and 80%, 
respectively.  Such pessimism is inconsistent with managers making solely optimistic forecasts. 
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The second type of analysis that we undertake is to investigate whether and why biases in 
managers’ multi-year revenue, expense or profitability forecasts reflect strategic behavior.  Our 
motivations are threefold.  First, we seek to determine whether the horizon-specific pessimism in 
revenues and expenses discussed above are consistent with strategic forecasting by managers.  
We conclude that they are.  For example, although one-year-ahead revenue forecasts are on 
average reliably pessimistic by 11%, one-year-ahead expense forecasts are reliably optimistic by 
more—28%—leading to one-year-ahead profitability forecasts that are upward biased by 35%.  
This could be consistent with managers strategically understating their true expectations of short-
term revenues and expenses so as to present venture investors with a favorable view of their 
current cash burn (via optimistic short-term expense forecasts) but also emphasize their need for 
new capital that will create higher revenues (via pessimistic short-term revenue forecasts). 
Our second motivation for considering strategic motives in managers’ forecasts is that 
managers of private venture-backed firms face a very strong incentive to overstate their forecasts 
of long-term future net income.  This is because the higher is the firm’s true long-term net 
income, the more likely is the forecasting firm to secure its next round of venture financing 
(without which, the firm may well go out of business).  In this sense, our paper is related to 
research that has used public company data to study the incentives that managers face to provide 
voluntary disclosures to access the capital markets and lower the firm’s cost of capital (Frankel, 
McNichols and Wilson, 1995; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000). 
We conclude that our evidence on long-term forecast biases are consistent with this view, 
because although three- through five-year-ahead expense forecasts are on average reliably 
pessimistic, three- through five-year-ahead revenue forecasts are even more optimistic, leading 
to one-year-ahead profitability forecasts that are optimistically biased by between 67% and 
122%.  We conjecture that managers realize that although their predictions of how large future 
revenues will be is hard for venture investors to disprove, the relations between future revenues 
and future expenses are somewhat constrained.  That is, managers realize that venture investors 
will (and do) pore over their pro-forma spreadsheets with a view to making sure that conditional 
on managers’ long-term revenue projections, long-term expense projections “exhibit reasonable 
internal consistency.”  We conjecture that this revenue-conditional constraint is what leads 
managers to make what appear to be pessimistic forecasts about their long-term future expenses. 
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Finally, we hypothesize that managers of venture-backed private companies are more 
likely to impart strategic bias to their financial forecasts the harder (costlier) it is for venture 
funds to verify the existence and magnitude of the firms’ economic assets.  Our reasoning draws 
on the insights of Rogers and Stocken (2005), who establish that managers of public firms are 
more likely to bias their forecasts when it is more difficult for investors to detect that they have 
misrepresented their information.  In our setting, we propose that the cost of verification is larger 
the more intangible-intensive is a firm, since intangible assets consist of R&D, patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, brand names, intellectual capital, innovative ideas and processes, all of 
which typically lack physical substance or liquid secondary markets, thereby making them hard 
to both audit and value (Lev, 2001).  Lacking direct measures on R&D, patents, etc., we use the 
industry sector that VentureOne classifies firms into as a proxy for intangible intensity. 
We find evidence consistent with the verification hypothesis.  For example, the forecast 
bias in profitability for healthcare/biotechnology firms (hard-to-verify assets) is two and eight 
times larger than that for retail firms (easy-to-verify assets).  Moreover, consistent with the idea 
that revenue forecasts are harder for venture investors to verify than expense forecasts, 
particularly when the underlying economic assets are hard-to-verify, biotechnology firms’ one- 
and five-year-ahead revenue forecasts are 49% and 305% optimistic, but retail firms’ one- and 
five-year-ahead revenue forecasts are 41% pessimistic and only 3% optimistic, respectively. 
Overall, our paper contributes to three literatures.  With regard to the management 
forecasting literature, we shed light on the properties of longer-term forecasts and forecast 
biases, not only for net income but also its revenue and expense components.  Our results suggest 
that not only are biases widespread in the financial forecasts made by managers of private 
venture-backed firms, but they appear to be strategic.  Specifically, we find that the magnitude 
and type of strategic bias that managers impart to their forecasts depends on both the forecast 
horizon and the verifiability of firms’ assets (Rogers and Stocken, 2005). 
With regard to the forecast evaluation literature, we import and apply from labor 
economics an alternative method of measuring financial forecast bias.  In this method, forecasts 
are compared to historically-grounded conditional projections, rather than to ex-post actual 
results.  As with any statistical or quasi-experimental tool, this method has strengths and 
weaknesses, but its robustness in our setting suggests that it may be a useful addition to 
conventional approaches to comparing financial forecasts with actuals.  For example, it may help 
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researchers to measure and understand biases in equity analysts’ long-term revenue and earnings 
growth forecasts (Dechow and Sloan, 1997; Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok, 2003). 
Finally, our study adds to the small but growing literature in accounting that focuses on 
the economics of young companies, particularly those backed by venture capital (Dávila, Foster 
and Gupta, 2003; Beuselinck, Deloof and Manigart, 2005; Dávila, 2005; Hand, 2005, 2006; 
Armstrong, Dávila and Foster, 2006; and Dávila and Foster, 2005, 2006).  Venture-backed firms 
are becoming increasingly important in the modern economy (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; 
National Venture Capital Association, 2004): Microsoft, Genentech, Apple Computer and 
Google among many others were once small startups whose ultra-rapid growth has significantly 
affected the U.S. and worldwide economies.  Among the contributions our paper makes to this 
emerging literature is that we systematically describe how young firms’ revenues, expenses and 
net income evolve over time, and the “hockey stick” aspects to managers’ financial forecasts.  
We also provide venture capital investors with measures of the size of the “haircuts” that they 
either do or might need to apply to managers’ forecasts at different horizons, such as those 
contained in business plans submitted to them by firms seeking high-risk capital. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we describe VentureOne’s 
financial forecast database.  Section 3 details the empirical methods we employ.  Section 4 
reports our empirical results; summarizes the results of several tests that assess the robustness of 
our results, particularly those aimed at assessing the methodological problems and risks inherent 
in the historical projection method; and points to future work.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Our analysis of the multi-year financial forecasts made by managers of private firms 
utilizes a database built and maintained by VentureOne.  VentureOne is a leading venture capital 
research firm that offers investors, service providers, and entrepreneurs comprehensive, accurate, 
and timely information on the venture capital industry.  VentureOne's products and services are 
designed to help venture capital firms, corporate investors, investment banks, and accounting and 
law firms identify private investment opportunities, perform due diligence and evaluate market 
trends, including benchmarking company valuations and documenting industry preferences. 
 VentureOne’s primary product is VentureSourceTM, an online and continuously updated 
set of venture capital data, including complete business information on investors and venture-
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backed companies, venture financing transactions, valuation information, and key executives and 
board members.2  One of many inputs into VentureSourceTM is VentureOne’s financial statement 
database.  This database contains historical and forecasted revenues and net income for a large 
number of U.S. and European venture-backed firms over (at most) the period 1985-2007. 
Most information in the VentureOne’s financial statement database comes from the 
regular contacts that VentureOne makes with venture-backed companies, most often in the form 
of quarterly emails asking firms to update their VentureOne profile.3  Firms benefit from 
providing VentureOne with their revenue, expense and net income forecasts because they do not 
have to pay to have their data included and their forecasts are immediately loaded into their 
company profile maintained in VentureSourceTM.  This makes it possible for firms to efficiently 
alert venture capital funds to their projected future business activities and results.  The only 
entities that VentureOne allows (or in all likelihood can afford) to subscribe to VentureSourceTM 
are venture capital and private equity funds, and strategic corporate investors.  These businesses 
comprise the major potential suppliers of equity capital to young technology startup firms.  Other 
than large corporations with legitimate venture capital subsidiaries, actual or potential 
competitors to venture-backed startups are not allowed to subscribe to VentureSourceTM.  As a 
result, VentureOne acts as an agnostic and independent information conduit between private 
firms that demand capital and venture and private equity funds that supply it. 
 The nature of VentureOne’s financial statement database is illustrated in figure 1.  Two 
features warrant attention.  First, of critical importance to our study is the fact that for each firm 
in the database, VentureOne reports a single time-series of between zero to 12 years of historical 
annual revenues and net income followed by between zero and eight years of forecasted revenues 
or net income.4  This means that there is no historical revenue or net income data against which a 
given firm’s forecasts can be compared against actuals, so conventionally defined forecast errors 
                                                 
2 VentureSourceTM covers U.S., European and Israeli startups and investors.  It holds data on 21,000 companies and 
7,000 investors, over 50,900 transactions and over 131,900 key executives.  Research that has used VentureOne data 
include, among others, Gompers and Lerner (2000), Dávila, Foster and Gupta (2003), Seppä (2003), Cochrane 
(2005), Dávila and Foster (2005), Hand (2005, 2006), and Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005). 
3 We acknowledge that the voluntary and self-reported updating by firms of their VentureOne profile may lead to 
incomplete data records.  For example, Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg (KSS, 2002) report that VentureOne and 
Venture Economics exclude roughly 15% of the financing rounds of 143 actual venture financings obtained by KSS 
from fourteen venture capital partnerships.  However, KSS find that unlike Venture Economics, VentureOne’s 
financing data exhibits no significant bias.  The degree to which the incompleteness exhibited by financing data 
extends to non-financing data of the kind we study is an important issue on which no research has yet been done. 
4 We compute total expenses as the difference between revenues and net income, where both exist. 
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(viz., actual less forecast) cannot be computed.5  We address this limitation by developing an 
alternative method of estimating the bias in firms’ financial forecasts in section 3.1. 
 The second notable feature of VentureOne’s financial statement database is that there 
may be selection forces at work regarding which firms do and do not provide forecasts, why they 
do or do not provide forecasts, and when and why a forecast in the database is or is not updated 
by overwriting it with the actual financial statement results that subsequently occurred (if there 
were any, since the firm might have merged or gone out of business).  We elaborate on these 
limitations and our approach to assessing their significance in section 4.4 and appendix A. 
 Table 1 describes the selection criteria that were applied to VentureOne’s financial 
statement database so as to obtain a set of firm-year observations that could be used to estimate 
the biases, if any, in firms’ one- through five-year-ahead forecasts of revenue, expense and net 
income.  The strictures imposed were that a firm’s founding date, industry classification, and 
state location had to be available in VentureSourceTM; revenue in a given year could not be 
missing, even if net income was reported; the fiscal year corresponding to a revenue number had 
to be known and not before 1985 or after 2007; a firm could not be more than 15 years old in the 
year corresponding to the revenue number; revenues had to be “Actual” or “Forecast”, not 
“Estimated”; and forecasts had to have a horizon of no more than five years ahead.  Beyond 
these criteria, we also excluded a few extreme outliers that were visually identified from scatter 
plots of revenue against firm age.6  In total, these restrictions left 9,276 U.S. firm-years between 
1985 and 2007 for which there is either an historical or forecasted revenue figure available.7
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on firm age, industry composition, U.S. states in 
which firms are headquartered, and the distribution of historical revenues and one- through five-
year-ahead revenue forecasts relative to the fiscal years they pertain to.  Firm age is distributed 
similarly across historical and forecasted observations (panel A).  Firms are concentrated in the 
industry sectors defined by VentureOne as Information Technology, Healthcare/Biotech and 
Retail & Consumer/Business Products/Services.  A heavy geographic clustering of firms is seen 
                                                 
5 Although VentureOne regularly updates and therefore overwrites its database, it would in principle be possible to 
compare forecasts to subsequent forecasts if prior versions of the database were available, for example, one CD per 
year going back to 1985.  However, we have been informed by VentureOne that they do not keep historical records. 
6 Most extreme outliers were pure data errors.  For example, several outliers had firm age information that 
dramatically understated the true age of the firm, thereby yielding an incorrectly high revenue figure. 
7 The most significant data restriction is the absence of a firm’s founding date.  Although we include firm age as a 
key variable in our analysis, repeating the analyses in the study without firm age lead to similar estimates of, and 
inferences with regard to, the degree and nature of management biases in revenues, expenses and profitability. 
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in California and to a lesser degree Massachusetts, although a full tabulation reveals that 
virtually every state in the U.S. is represented at least once (panel B).  Finally, while the number 
of forecasts declines as the forecast horizon increases, even at the five-years-ahead horizon there 
are 139 forecasts in the database, each of which is made by a different firm (panel C).  And 
although not explicitly shown, almost all firms with, say, a five-year-ahead revenue forecast also 
have four-, three-, two- and one-year ahead revenue forecasts. 
 Moving to firms’ actual and forecasted revenues, expenses and net incomes, figure 2 
visually displays the medians of these financial variables as a function of firm age.8  All 
variables are expressed in real terms pivoting from the CPI in June 2005.  Two aspects warrant 
attention.  First, managers’ forecasts of their firms’ revenues exceed the revenues historically 
experienced by firms of the same age.  For example, firms that are seven years old are forecasted 
by their managers to have median real revenue of $25 million, whereas the median real revenue 
of firms seven years old based on historical data is only $12 million. The same applies to 
expenses, although the gap is not quite so pronounced.  Second, managers appear highly 
optimistic about how old their firm will be when it first turns a profit.  The median age at which 
firms historically first turn a profit is 10 years old, but the median age at which firms forecast 
that they will turn profitable is only four years old. 
 Table 3 provides another view of managers’ forecasts versus firms’ historical data by 
reporting as a function of the forecasting horizon the medians and means of revenues, expenses 
and net income (panel A), the means and key percentiles of firms’ annual growth rates in 
revenue and expense (panels B - C), and net income-to-expense profitability ratios (panel D).9  
We highlight three aspects of table 3.  First, table 3 suggests that managers’ revenue forecasts 
appear to embed far higher annual rates of growth than those justified by historical performance 
of private venture-backed companies as a group.  For example, panel A shows that at the median, 
managers forecast that one-year-ahead revenues of $5.3 million will grow to five-year-ahead 
revenues of $61.0 million, an implied annual rate of 84%.  But panel B indicates that the median 
annual growth rate in actual, realized revenues is only 48%.  Moreover, in terms of year-to-year 
revenue growth rates, managers’ optimism appears to be more severe the shorter is the forecast 
                                                 
8 Unreported results show that means yield qualitatively the same inferences, but are far less amenable to being 
presented in an easy-to-read visual display because a minority of firms experience huge revenues as they mature, 
thereby distorting the visual scale onto which all means are reported. 
9 We report net income-to-expense rather than net income-to-revenue ratios to minimize the statistical distortions 
created by zero revenues or very small revenues. 
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horizon, peaking at two-years-ahead.10  A similar but less extreme pattern is seen for expenses 
(panel C), although the larger growth rates implicit in managers’ forecasts of expenses than 
suggested by history point to unconditional pessimism, not optimism. 
 The second observation of note in table 3 is that as judged by net income-to-expense 
profitability ratios, managers’ forecasts point to future profitability substantially above that of the 
historical reported profitability—or lack thereof—manifested private venture-backed firms as a 
group.  For example, the median historical net income-to-expense profitability ratio is –34% 
(panel D).  However, managers’ median forecasted net income-to-expense ratio ranges between 
–20% at the one-year-ahead horizon to 21% at the five-year-ahead horizon.   Similar optimism is 
apparent in the other percentiles, particularly the 10th and 25th.11  
Third, panel E of table 3 reports the results of regressing two measures of firms’ 
historical profitability on each of the three major industry sectors (Healthcare/Biotech; 
Information Technology; Retail & Cons/Bus Prod/Serv), and firm age.  The results indicate that 
historical reported profitability varies substantially across industry.  This suggests that it will 
likely be important to take industry sector into account in developing historically-grounded 
predictions to compare against managers’ financial forecasts.  Also, we interpret the rank 
ordering of historical profitability across the three major industry sectors to be indicative of the 
relative intensity of intangibles in the economic assets of firms in those industries.  This is 
because the accounting for intangibles such as R&D and intellectual capital is full and immediate 
expensing (capitalization of internally generated R&D is not permitted under GAAP), leading to 
bigger expenses and therefore seemingly worse reported profitability the more intangible are the 
firm’s economic assets, particularly when the firm is growing rapidly.  We exploit this inference 
in section 4.3 when we analyze the extent to which managers’ financial forecast biases depend 
on asset verifiability, for which we use intangible-intensity as our proxy. 
 In total, the largely unconditional and therefore preliminary evidence reported in figure 2 
and table 3 suggests that managers of young, private venture-backed companies more often than 
not make forecasts that are higher—sometimes hugely so—than historically justified norms.  In 
                                                 
10 Some very high one- and two-year-ahead forecasted growth rates are in part due to companies that have very low 
revenues in the denominator of the growth rate calculation. 
11 The dominance of reported losses in our sample echoes the results reported by Armstrong, Dávila and Foster 
(2006).  They report that for a sample of 502 venture-backed companies that went public, the 10th through 70th 
percentiles of net income is always negative in each of the three years prior to the IPO, the year of the IPO, and the 
three years immediately following the IPO. 
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the next section, we introduce to the accounting literature an alternative method of measuring the 
degree of bias in financial forecasts, and seek to determine whether, by how much, and why 
biases in our sample of managers’ forecasts of revenues, expenses and profitability depend on 
forecasting horizon and the verifiability of firms’ economic assets. 
 
3. A New Approach to Measuring Biases in Managers’ Financial Forecasts 
 
By its construction, VentureOne’s financial statement dataset does not permit us to 
measure multi-year forecast biases in the conventional way—that is, by comparing forecasts to 
actuals and then averaging the resulting forecast errors.  Instead, we measure forecast bias by 
comparing managers’ forecasts with what would be expected given the historical performance of 
firms as a whole, and conditioning on key characteristics of the firm itself.  We refer to the latter 
as historically-grounded conditional projections, or historical projections for short.  This type of 
approach is known as the ‘residual difference method’ in labor economics, where is often used to 
investigate charges of pay discrimination against minorities (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973; 
Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994).12  The method is not without methodological risks, and we elaborate 
on these and our approach to assessing their significance in section 4.4 and appendix A. 
 
3.1 Historical projection method of predicting revenues, expenses and net income 
 
We illustrate the historical projection approach using revenues.  First, for the full set of 
6,890 available firm-year actual revenues described in table 2 (panel A) and table 3, we estimate 
a simple “baseline” revenue model for each of the k = 1 to 4 industry sectors into which 
VentureOne classifies firms in its database (Healthcare/Biotech; Information Technology; Retail 
& Cons/Bus Prod/Serv; and Other): 
  (1) it
s
isskitkkit DSTATEfirmageREV ευβα +++= ∑
=
4
1
 
This baseline model is simple in that it conjectures that firm i’s historical revenue in calendar 
year t depends only on firm age in year t, and the state that the firm is headquartered in.  Firm 
                                                 
12 In the setting of pay discrimination, a model of what pay should be for all employees in the absence of 
discrimination is first estimated on non-minorities using explanatory variables such as education, job performance 
and job tenure.  The parameters from this model are then used to predict pay for minorities based on their education, 
job performance and job tenure.  If predicted pay for minorities is substantially more than their actual pay, then this 
method argues that there is cause to suspect that minorities are being discriminated against with regard to pay. 
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age is a proxy for firm maturity, with more mature firms being more likely to have converted 
tangible and intangible assets into ongoing revenue.  State dummies (CA, MA, NY and TX) are 
proxies for high density geographic externalities, e.g., being located in Silicon Valley.  We 
expect βk to be positive, but make no magnitude or sign predictions for any skυ . 
We then project the parameters obtained by estimating equation (1) using OLS onto the 
full set of 2,386 firm-year forecasted revenues.  This yields 2,386 historically-grounded 
conditional revenue projections—that is, estimates of what revenues would be expected to be 
given the revenues private venture-backed firms’ experience, and the age and state of the firm. 
However, for some firms we know more information than just their age and state.  In 
particular, and as shown visually in figure 1, we often know a firm’s lagged revenues (either 
actual or forecasted) in a given year.13  When REVi,t–1 is available, we therefore exploit this 
additional information, thereby obtaining a more precise historical projection of revenues, by 
replacing the historical projection of revenues obtained through equation (1) with that obtained 
through equation (2) below, also estimated separately by industry sector: 
  (2) '
4
1
''
1,
''
  it
s
isksitktikkit DSTATEfirmageREVREV ευβγα ++++= ∑
=
−
We expect firm growth to manifest itself in  being greater than one for all industry sectors, and 
 to be positive for all industry sectors.  However, as in equation (1) we do not make 
magnitude or sign predictions for any . 
'
kγ
'
kβ
'
ksυ
The mechanical application of equation (2) is appropriate for generating historical 
projections of one-year-ahead revenue, since one-year-lagged revenue is an actual number.  
However, when generating historical projections of revenue at horizons beyond one year, one-
year-lagged revenue mechanically taken from the VentureOne database is a management 
forecast number.  Thus, to obtain (say) two-year-ahead historical projections of revenue, we 
project the parameter estimates from equation (2) onto the characteristics of firms with two-year-
ahead revenue forecasts and non-missing values of the independent variables listed in (2), where 
REVi,t-1 is not the one-year-ahead revenue forecast made by the firm but rather is the historical 
                                                 
13 Some firms have more than one year of lagged revenues.  However, lagged revenues beyond one year add little 
explanatory power over and above revenue lagged one year. 
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projections of one-year-ahead revenue already calculated in the previous step.  We do likewise 
for three-, four- and five-year-ahead revenue forecasts and thereby obtain on a firm-year-
observation by firm-year-observation basis historically-grounded conditional projections of 
revenues that use the greatest amount of firm-specific information.  We denote such revenue 
predictions as HPREDREVit. 
Finally, denoting MANFCASTREVit as the forecast of revenue made by manager of firm i 
for calendar year t, we define the revenue forecast error for firm i for calendar year t as: 
 
it
itit
it HPREDREV
FEREV = HPREDREVVMANFCASTRE −  (3) 
The forecast errors defined in equation (3) are then averaged, either unconditionally or by the 
length of the forecasting horizon.14  For expenses, we apply the same methods as just described 
for revenues.  For revenues and expenses, we compute mean forecast errors as weighted 
averages, where the weights are the inverse of the standard errors of the predicted revenues.  This 
explicitly takes into account that the predicted values of revenues obtained by applying equation 
(2) will be much more precise than will those obtained from equation (1), and likewise for 
expenses.15  Accompanying t-statistics are also computed using these same weights.  Since net 
income can be (and indeed, typically is) negative, forecast errors for net income are defined in 
terms of profitability, namely forecasted net income less predicted net income, scaled by 
predicted revenues, where predicted net income equals predicted revenues less predicted 
expenses: 
 
 
it
ititit
it HPREDREV
HPREDEXPHPREDREVMANFCASTNIFENI )(
−−=  (4) 
                                                 
14 We base our inferences on mean forecast errors, rather than median forecast errors, because we estimate equations 
(1) and (2) using OLS.  The reason for using OLS is that we assume that when making their forecasts, managers face 
a symmetric squared error loss function, rather than a symmetric linear loss function.  As a result, the historically-
grounded conditional projections obtained by applying the parameter estimates from equations (1) and (2) onto firm-
specific data are such that if equations (1) and (2) are well specified, the expected value of the mean forecast error as 
defined in equation (3) will be zero. 
15 Very similar inferences obtain if equal weights—i.e., simple averages—are calculated instead. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Comparison of the drivers of historical vs. management forecasted revenues, expenses 
and net income 
 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) for firms’ historical and 
forecasted revenues, expenses, and net incomes (panels A and B, respectively).  For each 
financial variable, equation (1) is the left hand side regression in the table, while equation (2) is 
the right hand side regression.  The results reported are the mean values obtained from estimating 
the regressions separately for each of VentureOne’s four industry sectors (Healthcare/Biotech; 
Information Technology; Retail & Consumer/Business Products/Services; and Other).  Intercepts 
and four state dummies (CA, MA, NY, TX) are estimated but for reasons of parsimony their 
parameter estimates are not reported. 
We highlight the following results from table 4.  First, in terms of equation (1), we find 
that as expected, the historical revenues, expenses and net incomes of private venture-backed 
companies reliably increase with age.  Next, in terms of equation (1), managers’ forecasts of 
revenues, expenses and net incomes also reliably increase with firm age, although they do so at a 
rate relative to historical revenues, expenses and net incomes that is only significantly larger for 
net income (comparison of coefficient estimates on firm age across panel B versus panel A). 
Table 4 also demonstrates that where possible, including the one-year lagged value of the 
dependent variable is very important, in that the t-statistics on the parameter estimates on the 
one-year lagged values of dependent variables are highly significant, and in four of the six 
regressions, result in insignificant coefficients on firm age.  Moreover, unlike the insignificant 
differences on between firm age coefficients in equation (1) for revenues and expenses, the 
coefficients on one-year lagged revenues and expenses are very significantly larger for forecasts 
than for actuals. 
Finally, we refine equation (2) when net income is the dependent variable to allow for 
different coefficients on positive and negative one-year lagged net income.  This is to determine 
if managers are optimistic both when their most recent actual net income is positive and when it 
is negative.  Although consistent with this view, the point estimates on positive (negative) one-
year lagged net income are larger (smaller) for forecasts than for actuals, unreported tests 
indicate that the differences are not statistically significant. 
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4.2 Mean management forecast errors for revenues, expenses and profitability 
 
 Table 5 and figure 3 report the most important results of our study, namely the mean 
percentage errors for managers’ forecasts of revenues, expenses and profitability.  The forecast 
errors analyzed in table 5 are those obtained by applying the historically-grounded conditional 
projection method detailed in section 3.1, with two refinements.  First, the inability of equations 
(1) and (2) to fit perfectly historical data on occasion yields a small number of negative predicted 
revenues or predicted expenses.16  Since negative revenues or expenses are not possible, we 
exclude such observations.  Also, predicted revenues or expenses are sometimes positive but 
very small.  When divided into forecast numbers, this can result in extreme outlier forecast errors 
as defined via equation (3).  We therefore exclude observations where revenue or expense 
forecast errors exceed 2,500%.17  The small and largely insignificant mean in-sample forecast 
errors reported in panel A of table 5 for historical revenues, expenses and profitability indicate 
that the refinements outlined above do not materially distort the mean of the forecast error 
distribution relative to its theoretical value. 
As emphasized in the introduction of our paper, our goals in estimating mean 
management forecast errors are twofold: [1] To document for our sample of private venture-
backed young companies whether and how the signs and magnitudes of any management 
forecast biases vary as a function of the length of the forecasting horizon, and [2] to investigate 
whether and why biases in managers’ multi-year revenue, expense or profitability forecasts 
reflect strategic behavior on the part of managers. 
The motivation behind our first goal is centered in prior work in entrepreneurship that has 
argued theoretically, and concluded empirically, that entrepreneurs are hard-wired to be highly 
optimistic and risk seeking (e.g., Simon, Houghton and Aquino, 1999; Rigotti, Ryan and 
Vaithianathan, 2003; Landier and Thesmar, 2004; Puri and Robinson, 2005; Lowe and Ziedonis, 
2006).  If this is the case, then we would expect the managers making the forecasts provided by 
firms to VentureOne to be similarly hard-wired in terms of behaviorally-based optimism, leading 
us to predict that those managers’ forecasts of revenues, expenses and profitability will be 
                                                 
16 For example, less than 0.5% of the in-sample fitted values in estimating equation (1) for revenues are negative. 
17 The fraction of observations excluded due to these criteria is very small.  For example, less than 0.8% of revenue 
forecast errors need to be deleted. 
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optimistic at all forecasting horizons, be present for all firms, and increase as the length of the 
forecasting horizon increases. 
The first result that we highlight in panel A of table 5 and panel A of figure 3 is 
consistent with this prediction.  This is that managers’ forecasts of profitability are optimistic at 
all horizons, and become substantially more optimistic as the forecasting horizon increases from 
one- to five-years-ahead.  For all firm-year data pooled together, managers of private venture-
backed U.S. firms make one-year-ahead forecasts of net income scaled by predicted revenues 
that are on average 35% too high, and this bias rises monotonically such that five-year-ahead 
forecasts of profitability are 122% too high. 
However, separately analyzing managers’ revenue and expense forecasts indicates that 
managerial optimism is not invariably present.  We report in panel A of table 5 that one-year-
ahead revenue forecasts are reliably understated (i.e., pessimistic) by an average of 11%, 
whereas two- through five-year-ahead revenue forecasts are reliably and increasingly overstated 
(i.e., optimistic).  The optimism bias in revenue forecasts monotonically increases as the forecast 
horizon increases (42% two-years-ahead rising to 212% five-years-ahead).  Also, whereas one-
year-ahead expense forecasts are reliably understated (i.e., optimistic) by an average of 28%, 
two- through five-year-ahead expense forecasts are either unbiased or reliably overstated (i.e., 
pessimistic).  And as is the case with revenues, the pessimism bias in expense forecasts 
monotonically increases as the forecast horizon increases (being 25% three-years-ahead, 41% 
four-years-ahead, and 80% five-years-ahead).18
 
4.3 Strategic distortion of forecasts by managers 
 
The above documented mixture of optimism and pessimism in part motivates our 
investigation into whether and why biases in managers’ multi-year revenue, expense or 
profitability forecasts reflect strategic behavior on the part of managers.  More importantly, 
though, is the fact that private venture-backed firms face very strong incentives to intentionally 
and strategically overstate their forecasts of long-term future net income to external parties.  This 
                                                 
18 Unreported tests indicate that qualitatively similar results to those in panel A of table 5 obtain if year dummies are 
added to equations (1) and (2); if the miscellaneous industry sector defined by VentureOne as Other is excluded 
from the analysis; if profitability is directly modeled, rather than being determined by separate modeling of revenues 
and expenses; if the computation of forecast errors is limited to firm-years where equation (1) only is well defined; 
and if the computation of forecast errors is limited to firm-years where equation (2) only is well defined, that is, 
firm-years where the lagged value of the financial variable is available.  
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is because the higher is the firm’s perceived long-term net income, the more likely is the 
forecasting firm to secure its next round of venture financing—without which the firm may well 
go out of business, given the deliberately staged nature of venture capital.  Moreover, the terms 
of new funding are important to existing managers.  The higher is the pre-money firm value in 
subsequent funding rounds, the lower is the dilution to current equity holders.  The greatly 
heightened need that young high-technology companies have for capital, relative to more mature 
public companies, therefore makes them a powerful setting for studying strategic forecasting.  
We view the already presented evidence on long-term forecast biases (Table 5, panel A) 
as consistent with this view, because although three- through five-year-ahead expense forecasts 
are on average reliably pessimistic, three- through five-year-ahead revenue forecasts are reliably 
even more optimistic, leading to one-year-ahead profitability forecasts that are optimistically 
biased by between 67% and 122%.  Although potentially post hoc as an explanation, we 
conjecture that managers realize that although their predictions of the size of future revenues will 
be difficult for venture investors to disprove, the relations between future revenues and expenses 
are largely constrained.  That is, we suggest that managers realize that venture investors will (and 
do) pore over their pro-forma spreadsheets with a view to making sure that conditional on 
managers’ long-term revenue projections, long-term expense projections “exhibit reasonable 
internal consistency.”  We propose that this revenue-conditional constraint is what leads 
managers to make what appear to be pessimistic forecasts about their long-term future expenses. 
Separate from results already discussed, we develop the idea that managers make 
strategic forecasts by hypothesizing that managers of private venture-backed firms are more 
likely to impart strategic bias to their financial forecasts the harder (costlier) it is for venture 
funds to verify the existence and magnitude of the firms’ economic assets.  Our reasoning here 
draws on the insights of Rogers and Stocken (2005), who establish that managers of public firms 
are more likely to bias their forecasts when it is more difficult for investors to detect that they 
have misrepresented their information.  In our setting, we propose that the cost of verification is 
larger the more intangible-intensive is a firm, since intangible assets consist of R&D, patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, brand names, intellectual capital, innovative ideas and processes, all of 
which typically lack physical substance or liquid secondary markets, thereby making them hard 
to both audit and value (Lev, 2001).  Lacking direct measures on R&D, patents, etc., we 
empirically test this view by using the industry sector that VentureOne classifies firms into as a 
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proxy for intangible intensity.  We argue that firms in the Healthcare/Biotech industry sector—
which are predominantly biotechnology companies—are more intangible intensive than are firms 
in the Information Technology sector, which in turn are more intangible intensive than are firms 
in the Retail & Consumer/Business Products/Service sector.19
Panels B – D of table 5, which compute and present mean management forecast errors for 
revenues, expenses and profitability by industry sector, report evidence that we interpret as being 
consistent with the verification hypothesis.  Comparing panels B, C and D indicates that the 
profitability forecast bias for biotechnology firms (with very intangible and therefore hard-to-
verify assets) exceeds the profitability forecast bias for IT firms (moderately difficult-to-verify 
assets) which in turn exceeds the profitability forecast bias for retail firms (easy-to-verify assets).  
Drilling into the components of profitability, consistent with the proposition that revenue 
forecasts are harder for venture investors to verify than expense forecasts, particularly when the 
underlying economic assets are hard-to-verify, we find that biotechnology firms’ one- and five-
year-ahead revenue forecasts are respectively 49% and 305% optimistic, IT firms’ one- and five-
year-ahead revenue forecasts are 27% pessimistic and 204% optimistic, respectively, and retail 
firms’ one- and five-year-ahead revenue forecasts are 41% pessimistic and only 3% optimistic, 
respectively.  Revenues exhibit a similar ordering of biases across the three industry sectors. 
In table 6 we formally test whether the average differences suggested in panels B – D of 
table 5 are statistically significant.  Table 6 reports the results of regressing table 5’s 
management forecast error on the three key industry sector dummies, controlling for forecast 
horizon, firm age, and headquarter location.  The F-test p-values reported at the bottom of table 6 
indicate that in every case the average differences between forecast errors across industry sectors 
(whether revenue, expense or profitability) are significantly in the predicted directions.  Based on 
the results in Tables 5 and 6 we conclude that there is reliable evidence in our sample of firms 
that managers strategically bias their forecasts in a way that takes advantage of the varying 
industry-specific difficulties facing venture funds in verifying the legitimacy of the economic 
assets underlying firms’ multi-year forecasts. 
 
                                                 
19 We do not report results for the industry sector defined by VentureOne as “Other” due to this sector having 
relatively few available forecast errors, particularly at longer forecasting horizons. 
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4.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the historically-grounded conditional prediction method 
 
The major conceptual advantage to the historical prediction method of estimating the 
degree of bias in managers’ financial forecasts is that the method can be applied to every forecast 
for which the independent variables in equations (1) and/or (2) are available.  The method does 
not require that there be an ex-post realization of the financial variable being forecasted. 
Requiring that there be long-term ex post actual results to compare against long-term forecasts 
by young firms would substantially reduce the number of data points, and likely impart selection 
problems to such observations.  This is because young companies, particularly those financed by 
venture capital, face either significant going-concern risks or the possibility of exit as a trade 
sale.  They are therefore quite likely not to survive as an independent company five years into the 
future, biasing the realizations of revenues, expenses and net income to compare against 
managers’ forecasts to the most successful companies—typically, but not exclusively those that 
go IPO.  In addition, venture-backed early stage companies often go through multiple changes in 
their business model.  Relative to established companies, forecasts made for early stage firms are 
more likely to manifest an “apples-to-oranges” mismatch between the business model in place at 
the time of the forecast, and the business model in place at the time of the ex-post realization. 
There are, however, some potential drawbacks and inferential risks involved in applying 
the historical prediction method to our setting.  We now elaborate on these and describe our 
approaches to assessing their significance in our particular setting. 
The first potential problem with the historical prediction method is that unbiased 
historical predictions from equations (1) and (2) require that the VentureOne data used in 
estimating the equations be a random sample of all historical financial results experienced by live 
private venture-backed firms.20  This is likely not the case in that VentureOne obtains 
approximately three-quarters of its actual, historical data from firms’ IPO filing documents.21  In 
contrast, the fraction of all venture-backed firms that go public is only 10% - 15% (Armstrong, 
Dávila and Foster, 2006).  Since firms that go IPO are on average more successful than those that 
do not, this selection problem in our setting will likely lead to upward-biased historically-
grounded conditional predictions of revenues, expenses and net income.  Per equations (3) and 
                                                 
20 Firms must be alive to generate actual financial data.  However, firms making financial forecasts also make their 
forecasts assuming they will be alive over the forecasting horizon.  Thus, the requirement that a firm be alive rather 
than dead does not impose a differential bias across historical versus forecasted revenues, expenses and net income.  
21 The remaining one quarter of VentureOne actuals come from press releases and other secondary sources.   
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(4) in section 3.1, this will then lead to downward-biased mean forecast errors—suggesting that 
if anything, the mean forecast errors we report in table 5 are too small, not too large. 
A second potential drawback to the historical prediction method is that a firm’s decision 
as to whether to provide VentureOne with financial forecasts may be correlated with economic 
factors not modeled in equations (1) and (2).  Stated differently, the forecasts voluntarily 
provided by managers to VentureOne may not be a random sample of those available in the 
business plan spreadsheets of the population of private venture-backed U.S. firms’ CFOs.  
Although all voluntary disclosures by managers create selection concerns for researchers, it may 
be that the issue is more severe in our data because firms typically only submit forecasts to 
VentureOne when they are seeking venture funding.  It might therefore be that firms only submit 
revenue forecasts to VentureOne when their true forecasts are strong/high, and not when they are 
weak/low, because obtaining venture funding is more likely in the former case than in the latter.  
Unfortunately, without access to a random sample of the internal forecasts of firms, particularly 
those that do not submit forecasts to VentureOne, we cannot empirically measure the severity of 
the inferential threat posed by this concern.  However, we note that needing further venture 
funding is not at all an unusual state-of-the-world for venture-backed firms to be in—in fact, it is 
the most common because venture funds deliberately stage (i.e., spread out over time) the total 
amount of funding that might be needed for the firm to turn cash flow positive into several (even 
many) rounds of financing spread over three to eight years.  Moreover, although firms appear to 
stop submitting forecasts to VentureOne when they believe that their next round of financing will 
be an IPO, potentially leading to genuinely very strong forecasts being omitted from 
VentureOne’s database, this may be counteracted by overrepresentation of forecasts by firms that 
are highly anxious to obtain financing because they are financially very weak, and because of 
that desperation they provide VentureOne with deliberately very optimistic forecasts. 
In appendix A we detail the results of tests we undertook to try to quantify the potential 
biases described above.  In our first test, we assess the correspondence between our historically-
grounded conditional projections and ex-post historical actual observations by employing an out-
of-sample test.  We use a database created and used by Armstrong, Dávila and Foster (ADF, 
2006), who examine the valuation of venture-backed U.S. companies using 502 venture-backed 
companies that went public during 1996-2000.  When we re-estimate our revenue and expense 
models—equations (1) and (2)—using only the subset of firms in the VentureOne database that 
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went public, and then project the parameter estimates onto the characteristics of the subset of 
firms in the ADF database that are not in the VentureOne database, we find that for revenues, 
expenses and profitability, the mean differences between the actual values of the financial 
variable less the historically-grounded conditional projection are insignificantly different from 
zero.  Such results lead us to conclude that at least for the subset of VentureOne firms that go 
public, our use of historically-grounded conditional projections does not seem to impart 
systematic bias to the benchmarks against which manager’s forecasts are being compared. 
In our second test, we directly compensate for the differences in the ex-post success or 
failure between the firms whose historical data we use in developing the historical prediction 
model, and the firms whose management forecasts we compare to the historical predictions.  
Specifically, we augment equations (1) and (2) by including dummy variables that span the full 
set of the categories of ultimate firm status coded by VentureOne in their financial database in 
March 2005 (namely Out of Business; In Bankruptcy; Private and Independent; In IPO 
Registration; Acquired/Merged; and Publicly-Held).  We then follow the same approach as 
described in section 3.1 to arrive at what we term “ex-post business success adjusted historically-
grounded conditional projections” or ‘success-adjusted historical projections’ for short.  
Empirically, we find that the general pattern in the resulting mean forecast errors is similar to 
those reported in table 5—for example, that management forecasts of revenues, expenses and 
profitability are highly biased at long horizons.  The main difference is that we do no longer 
observe pessimism in one-year-ahead revenue forecasts.  We speculate that although this may 
indeed be true, it may also be that our success-adjusted historical projections reflect 
overcompensation on our part for sample selection bias.  This is because at the time that 
managers make their forecasts, neither they nor an outside observer knows for sure which 
category of ultimate firm status the firm will occupy, but our projection of the parameter 
estimates obtained from including ultimate firm status dummy variables in developing the 
success-adjusted historical projections assume that they do. 
Overall, while the historical projection method carries notable inferential risks, 
particularly in data such as VentureOne’s set of actual and forecasts, it appears to be sufficiently 
robust for us to conclude that there is reasonable evidence that the financial forecasts made by 
managers of private venture-backed companies are biased, and strategically so. 
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4.5 Future work 
 
 We view our paper as only a first step in seeking to understand the pervasive and crucial 
managerial responsibility of developing multi-year financial statement forecasts.  Many novel 
and worthwhile questions remain to be addressed.  For example, do strategic forecasts truly 
increase the probability of venture-backed firms obtaining funding, or the amount of funding, or 
the terms of the funding (such as the firm’s pre-money valuation)?  Does managerially imparted 
bias help or hinder the ability of the firm to hire employees, sign up new customers for its 
products, or attract analyst following?  We also think it would be worthwhile for future research 
to study to what extent, and why or why not, our results generalize to public firms, and to non-
venture-backed private companies.  This would likely involve the use of surveys. 
 We also believe that non-U.S. data warrants scrutiny as it becomes more available.  The 
VentureOne forecast database contains some data on the variables we analyze in this study for 
European venture-backed firms.  In appendix B, we report preliminary evidence on actual versus 
forecasted revenues, expenses and net income (and associated estimates of managerial forecast 
biases) for a relatively small set of European firms.  Given the different cultural, economic and 
capital markets that operate in Europe (e.g., more reliance on debt financing), we suggest that it 
would be worth, among other research thrusts, to document the factors (if any) attenuate or 
exacerbate the horizon biases that we document, both within and across countries.22
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper we have provided a preliminary analysis of the properties and determinants 
of managers’ multi-year financial forecasts.  We then deepened our inquiry by probing whether, 
by how much, and why biases in managers’ forecasts revenues, expenses and profitability 
depend on forecasting horizon and the verifiability of firms’ assets.  We used the one- to five-
year-ahead forecasts voluntarily reported by private venture-backed U.S. firms because public 
companies hardly ever make known managers’ internal multi-year financial projections to 
outsiders.  We also introduced a different method of measuring financial forecast bias that 
                                                 
22 For example, Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman (2006) report experimental evidence consistent with the idea that 
management forecasts that are disaggregated in nature are viewed by investors as more precise, less biased and more 
credible.  We do not find this in our data—specifically, we find the same magnitude of horizon biases in U.S. 
managers’ forecasts of revenues whether the revenue forecast is or is not accompanied by a forecast of net income. 
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compares forecasts to historically-grounded conditional projections, rather than to ex-post actual 
results. 
Subject to the limitations and unresolved uncertainties in the application of the historical 
projection method in our setting, and the marked limitations in generalizing to either publicly 
traded companies or non-venture-backed private firms, our results suggest that on average, 
managers’ forecasts of firm revenues and profitability are optimistic, but that this optimism 
increasing greatly as the forecast horizon rises to from one- to five-years-ahead.  At the same 
time, however, we also conclude that profitability forecasts appear to have a strategic component 
to them because revenue, expense and profitability forecasts are not uniformly optimistic.  
Instead, revenue (expense) forecasts appear to be asymmetrically but moderately pessimistic 
(optimistic) at short horizons, and asymmetrically but hugely optimistic (pessimistic) at long 
horizons.  Furthermore, we also find that biases in revenue and expense forecasts are more 
severe when the intangible-intensity—our proxy for the inverse of verifiability—of firms’ assets 
is high.  Since venture-backed firms are predominantly those with intangible assets, we believe 
that further research into how, when, and why entrepreneurial managers act strategically, and 
whether, how, when and why venture capital investors detect and adjust for such strategic 
behavior, is a worthwhile path to pursue. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Analysis of the severity of sample selection biases in VentureOne’s set of ex-post historical 
actuals and ex-ante management forecasts 
  
 
A.1 Correspondence between historically-grounded projections and historical actuals 
 
To assess the correspondence between our historically-grounded conditional projections 
and ex-post historical actual observations, we employ an out-of-sample test using a different 
database than VentureOne’s.  This different database is the one created and used by Armstrong, 
Dávila and Foster (ADF, 2006), who examine the valuation of venture-backed U.S. companies 
using 502 venture-backed companies spread across six industries.  Every firm in ADF’s dataset 
undertook an IPO during 1996-2000, and the financial statement data collected from IPO and 
other filing documents for ADF’s firms covers 1993-2005. 
We first re-estimate our revenue and expense models—equations (1) and (2)—using only 
the subset of firms in the VentureOne database that went public.  Because ADF’s data is more 
clustered in calendar time than is VentureOne’s we also include slope dummies on the lagged 
value of revenues or expenses in equation (2) when it applies, where the indicator variable equals 
one if the firm-year is between 1997 and 2000.23
The parameter estimates from our estimation of equations (1) and (2) on the subset of 
VentureOne firms that went public are then projected onto the characteristics of the subset of 
firms in the ADF database that are not in the VentureOne database.24  This yields projections for 
the ADF subset of what actual revenues, expenses and profitability would be if the models we 
estimated on the subset of VentureOne firms that went public are appropriately applied to a 
random sample of all venture-backed firms that go public. 
We define forecast errors in the ADF data subset as the actual value of the financial 
variable less the historical projection, scaled by the actual value.  Table A.1 below presents the 
mean forecast error for revenues, expenses and profitability.  The mean forecast errors for all 
three financial series are not significantly different from zero.  These results lead us to conclude 
                                                 
23  The results presented below are qualitatively similar when the indicator variables interacted with the lagged value 
of the financial variable for observations in 1997-2000 are replaced with indicator variables for those years.  
24  Fifteen firm-year observations in the ADF dataset for each of the revenue, expense and net income series were 
removed due to overlap with the VentureOne forecast database. 
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that at least for the subset of VentureOne firms that go public, our use of historically-grounded 
conditional projections would not seem to impart systematic biases into our inferences.   
 
Table A.1 
 
Mean percentage management forecast errors for revenues, expenses and profitability by 
forecasting horizons (Dataset = firms in the dataset used by Armstrong, Dávila and Foster, 
2006, that are not in the VentureOne dataset described in table 1) 
  
Statistics Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
Mean (t-statistic) 2% (0.8) 3% (1.6)  –1% (–0.2)  
           
 
 
A.2 Controlling for the ex-post status of the firm 
 
In our second test, we directly compensate for the differences in the ex-post success or 
failure between the firms whose historical data we use in developing the historical prediction 
model, and the firms whose management forecasts we compare to the historical predictions.  
Table A.2 below reports the relative frequencies of the categories of ultimate firm status coded 
by VentureOne in their financial database in March 2005 (Out of Business; In Bankruptcy; 
Private and Independent; In IPO Registration; Acquired/Merged; and Publicly-Held). 
 
Table A.2 
 
Relative frequency of sample firms’ business status in March 2005 
  
 Business status code  Managers’ 
 specified by VentureOne Actuals forecasts 
 Acquired or merged 8.7% 34.6% 
 In bankruptcy < 0.1 < 0.1 
 In IPO registration 1.1 < 0.1 
 Out of business 3.4 24.4 
 Private & independent 13.7 35.8 
 Publicly-held   73.0    5.1  
 
There are clearly substantial differences between actual and forecasted observations in 
our dataset.  Firm-year observations belonging to firms that went public appear to be over-
sampled in the actuals data (suggesting that historically-grounded conditional projections will if 
anything be too big, not too small).  In contrast, firm-year observations belonging to firms that 
went out of business appear to be oversampled in the forecast data (suggesting that mean forecast 
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errors may also be downward-biased because VentureOne’s set of managers’ forecasts may if 
anything be too low relative to the population of forecasts in firms’ spreadsheets). 
We attempt to take the differences in table A.2 into account by augmenting equations (1) 
and (2) through the inclusion of dummy variables that span the full set of ultimate firm status.  
We then follow the same approach as in section 3.1 of projecting the parameters estimated on 
only actuals data onto forecasted firms’ characteristics to arrive at what we term “ex-post 
business success adjusted historically-grounded conditional projections” or ‘success-adjusted 
historical projections’ for short.  The aggregate sample results are shown in table A.3. 
 
Table A.3 
 
Mean percentage management forecast errors for revenues, expenses and profitability by 
forecasting horizon, after conditioning on firms’ ultimate business status (at March 2005) 
  
 Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  
           
Historical data 6,670 0% (0.1) 6,120 3% (1.4) 5,974 –12% (–0.8)  
           
 
1 year ahead 1,130 28% (4.4) 598 4% (0.0) 562 22% (1.5) 
2 years ahead 413 115% (8.1) 297 58% (5.4) 274 72% (5.8) 
3 years ahead 271 252% (10.1) 233 138% (6.6) 213 100% (7.7) 
4 years ahead 194 295% (9.9) 179 191% (7.1) 164 113% (9.2) 
5 years ahead 120 355% (8.9) 115 254% (6.6) 109 130% (10.4)  
           
 
When compared to panel A of table 5 (which does not seek to control for differences in 
ultimate firm status), table A.3 suggest that the general pattern in the resulting mean forecast 
errors is similar to those reported in table 5.  For example, management forecasts of revenues, 
expenses and profitability remain highly biased at long horizons, and forecast bias increases as 
the length of the forecasting horizon increases.  The main difference is that we do no longer 
observe pessimism in one-year-ahead revenue or expense forecasts.  We speculate that although 
this may indeed be the case, it could also be that our success-adjusted historical projections in 
fact overcompensate for sample selection bias.  This is because at the time managers make their 
forecasts, neither they nor an outside observer knows for sure which category of ultimate firm 
status the firm will occupy.  However, our projection of the parameter estimates obtained from 
including ultimate firm status dummy variables in developing the success-adjusted historical 
projections assume that ultimate firm status is known at the time of the forecast. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Preliminary Evidence on Private Venture-Backed European Companies 
  
 
Since its first major growth spurt in the late 1970s, the U.S. venture capital industry has 
dominated the global venture market.  For example, Haemmig (2006) reports that global venture 
capital investments in 2005 were $31.9 billion, of which $21.1 billion or 69% were U.S. in 
origin, with only $4.5 billion or 15% being European. 
VentureOne has been extensively analyzing venture-backed U.S. companies since the 
early 1990s.  In recent years it has also expanded its attention to include venture-backed firms 
outside of the U.S.  Of the total firm-year observations in the VentureOne database provided to 
us, approximately 15% were for European companies.  
Our preliminary analysis of European data suggests that it differs from U.S. data in 
several respects.  One major difference is the scarcity of European management forecasts beyond 
two-years-ahead in the up to five-year-ahead forecasting horizon.  Of the observations 
VentureOne reports for European firms, 76% are one-year-ahead forecasts (U.S. is 52%), 13% 
are two-year-ahead forecasts (U.S. is 19%), and only 11% are span three-, four-, or five-year-
ahead horizons (U.S. is 29%).  A second distinction is that the European forecasts are heavily 
focused on 2001-2007, whereas U.S. forecasts have broad coverage over 1987-2007.  Thus the 
results we present in this Appendix pertain only to one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead forecasts 
for European companies.  It seems likely to suppose that more robust analysis will become 
possible only as substantially more years worth of data accumulates over the next decade. 
Table B.1 compares U.S. and European management forecasts.  European forecasts are 
limited here to those denominated in Euros (estimating separate models for each currency is 
infeasible given the limited data).  We stress that the European results cover far fewer 
observations and are markedly more time-period specific.  Taking $1 as approximately €1 over 
the sample period, table B.1 suggests that European companies typically forecast lower revenues 
and expenses than do U.S. venture-backed firms.  Consistent with the lower IRRs that European 
venture funds on average earn, untabulated results also show that European firms experience 
smaller revenue growth rates.  Rosa and Raade (2006) report that during the period 1999-2003 
(1994-2003), U.S. venture funds’ mean IRR was 23% (15%) versus 2.3% (8.3%) for European 
venture funds. 
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Table B.1 
 
Descriptive statistics for historical vs. management forecasted revenues, expenses and net income 
  
U.S. firms  Revenues Expenses Net income  
  #obs. Median Mean #obs. Median Mean #obs. Median Mean 
All historical data 6,890 $  5.9 $ 22.3 6,154 $ 11.9 $ 28.2 6,154 $–2.4 $–5.1 
Forecasts: 
 1-year-ahead 1,250 $  5.3 $ 14.2 621 $   7.6 $ 15.2 621 $–1.1 $–2.2 
 2-years-ahead 463 $11.9 $ 21.4 307 $   2.8 $ 21.8 307 $  0.7 $  1.4 
 
European firms  Revenues Expenses Net income  
  #obs. Median Mean #obs. Median Mean #obs. Median Mean 
All historical data 628 €  3.8 €  9.0 212 €  3.9 €  8.9 212 €  0.0 €–0.4 
Forecasts: 
 1-year-ahead 195 €  3.6 €  9.6 63 €  3.2 €  8.4 63 €  0.1 €–0.2 
 2 -years-ahead 35 €  4.1 €13.1 15 €  4.3 €  6.6 15 €  0.4 €–0.2 
 
 
 Table B.2 reports the results of estimating European managers’ financial forecast biases.  
Subject to the caveat of small sample sizes, it appears that European managers exhibit slightly 
optimistic forecasts of profitability at one- and two-year-ahead horizons.  However, the results 
are typically less statistically significant than with those obtained for U.S. data. 
 
Table B.2 
 
Comparison of mean management percentage forecast errors for U.S. versus European 
private venture-backed firms 
  
The European data is limited to observations denominated in Euros.  As with U.S. data, we 
estimate a separate model for actual historical data by industry sector.  Results below are for all 
industry sector observations pooled together. 
  
 Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
U.S. firms  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  
           
 
1-year-ahead 1,242 –11% (–2.6) 619 –28% (–6.0) 617 35% (10.6) 
2-years-ahead 459 42% (4.2) 306 –5% (–0.8) 303 64% (6.2) 
           
 
European firms  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  
           
 
1-year-ahead 186 5% (0.5) 59 –3% (0.1) 59 8% (3.3) 
2-years-ahead 35 30% (0.7) 14 22% (0.3) 15 7% (3.4) 
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Figure 1 
 
Illustrative example of the type of data in VentureOne’s financial forecast database 
  
 
 
• DataType 
• Implied EXP = REV – NI when both REV and NI are not missing. 
• Firm’s Fiscal Year = yyyy only (the mmdd component is not known). 
• Firm’s EntityID = firm identifier. 
• Missing data are coded as “.” 
o Forecast = forecast made by company management.  “Forecast” numbers also 
frequently come from secondary sources and simply indicate that the company’s 
managers expect to generate a certain amount of revenue or net income but has not 
actually done so yet. Such numbers can be changed to “Actual” if VentureOne gets 
actual information later. 
o Estimated = typically for past or current time periods.  Numbers are usually derived 
from secondary sources (such as press releases, VentureWire, the Wall Street Journal, 
Business Week, etc.) and, in the judgment of VentureOne’s research staff, are not 
specific enough to classify as “Actual.” For example, the secondary source may say 
that revenues are “in the $300-$500 mil range” so VentureOne would enter $400 mil.  
We exclude “Estimated” observations. 
o Actual = actual historical amount.  S-1 filings are the source for many, but not all, of 
the “Actual” figures.  If press releases or other secondary sources have very specific 
information, VentureOne codes it as “Actual.” 
Firm's Firm's REV NI Implied
EntityID Fiscal Year ($mil) ($mil) EXP ($mil) DataType
4 1992 6   -1.2   7.2   Actual
9 1994 0.15   -0.72   0.87   Actual
9 1995 1.27   -1.5   2.77   Actual
9 1996 7.14   -5.6   12.74   Actual
13 . 10   . . Estimated
13 1985 1.7   . . Actual
13 1986 . 2   . Actual
13 1987 10   0.2   9.8   Actual
13 1988 14   -1.6   15.6   Forecast
13 1989 17   0.1   16.9   Forecast
13 1990 25   2.4   22.6   Forecast
13 1991 40   6   34   Forecast
102   Forecast
125   Forecast
26 2001 130   28   
26 2002 170   45    
Figure 2 
 
Median historical vs. management forecasted real revenues, real expenses and real net income in $ millions, by firm age 
(Private venture-backed U.S. firms, 1985-2005) 
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Notes: All financial statement variables are in real terms (using the CPI pivot point of June 2005).  The data are restricted to those 
firm-year observations for which both revenues and net income were available. 
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Figure 3 
 
Distribution of percentage forecast errors in managers’ revenue, expense and profitability predictions, by forecast horizon 
(Private venture-backed U.S. firms, 1985-2007) 
  
 
Panel A:  Mean percent forecast errors 
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
 1 year
ahead
2 years
ahead
3 years
ahead
4 years
ahead
5 years
ahead
REV
EXP
Profitability
 
 
Note: Profitability is defined as net income scaled by revenue.  The methods by which forecast errors are computed are detailed in 
section 3.1 of the text.  
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Figure 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B:  Key percentiles of forecast error distributions 
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Table 1 
 
Selection criteria applied to VentureOne’s financial database to obtain 
firm-year observations that could be used to estimate the degree of bias in managers’ 
forecasts of one- through five-year-ahead revenues, expenses and profitability 
  
 
 
 
 U.S. firm-year observations in VentureOne database 14,567  
 Less: Observations where: 
 Firm’s founding date or industry classification or  
    state location were missing 4,171 
 Firm is more than 15 years old in year the forecast is for 507 
 Fiscal year was missing, before 1985, or after 2007 429 
 Revenues were datatype = “Estimated” 128 
 Observation was a forecast for six or more years ahead 38  
 Extreme outliers 18  
    5,285 
 = Firm-year revenue observations for private 
  venture-backed U.S. companies  9,276 
 
 Of which: Number of observations where datatype = “Actual” 6,890 
  Number of observations where datatype = “Forecast” 2,386 
 
  
 
Note 1:  Extreme outliers were identified from scatterplots of revenues against firm age.  Most outliers 
arise from miscodings of firm age (e.g., from a firm ten years old changing its name but then one year 
later being coded as being a one year old firm). 
 
Note 2:  All firm-year revenue observations do not have an associated expense number (see table 3),  
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive statistics on general characteristics of firms in VentureOne’s forecast database 
  
The sample is the set of private venture-backed U.S. firms in VentureOne’s financial forecast 
database that satisfy the selection criteria detailed in table 1. 
  
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics on firm age (in years) 
 
Type of data   # obs. Mean Stdev.  Min. Q1 Median  Q3   Max.  
Historical (actual) 6,890 5.2 3.2 0.1 2.7 4.4 7.0 15 
Management forecasts 2,386 5.6 2.8 0.1 3.5 5.2 7.2 15 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive statistics on VentureOne industry sectors, and firm headquarters 
 
VentureOne industry sector # obs.  Headquarter state    # obs.  
Healthcare/Biotech 2,552   (28%) California 3,719 
Information Technology 4,916   (53%) Massachusetts 1,056 
Retail & Cons/Bus Prod/Serv 1,517   (16%) Texas 450 
Other    291     (3%) New York    322 
 9,276 (100%) Other states 3,729 
   9,276 
 
Panel C:  Distribution of number of historical and forecasted revenues by calendar time 
 
   1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years  
 Historical ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead 
   Years data forecast forecast forecast forecast forecast  
1985 - 86 59 5 1 0 0 0 
1987 - 88 247 20 11 4 1 0 
1989 - 90 735 26 9 14 7 2 
1991 - 92 1,077 65 37 15 7 4 
1993 - 94 958 79 75 52 29 9 
1995 - 96 962 88 55 65 58 26 
1997 - 98 1,102 153 80 65 39 40 
1999 - 00 746 208 53 31 44 35 
2001 - 02 632 377 61 24 14 7 
2003 - 04 372 189 68 28 14 7 
2005 - 07 0 40 13 13 10 9  
1985 - 07 6,890 1,250 463 311 223 139  
1985 - 07 100% 52% 20% 13% 9% 6%  
 
Note:  Forecasts are classified based on the year the forecast applies to, not the year in which the forecast is made. 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive statistics for historical vs. management forecasted revenues, expenses and net income 
  
The sample is the set of private venture-backed U.S. firms in VentureOne’s financial statement 
database that satisfy the selection criteria detailed in table 1.  All financial statement variables are 
in real terms (using the CPI pivot point of June 2005).  Annual growth rates for forecasts beyond 
one-year-ahead are defined using year-to-year increases in forecasts.   
  
 
Panel A:  Revenues Expenses Net income  
  #obs. Median Mean #obs. Median Mean #obs. Median Mean 
All historical data 6,890 $  5.9 $ 22.3 6,154 $ 11.9 $ 28.2 6,154 $–2.4 $–5.1 
Forecasts: 
 1-year-ahead 1,250 5.3 14.2 621 7.6 15.2 621 –1.1 –2.2 
 2-years-ahead 463 11.9 21.4 307 12.8 21.8 307 0.7 1.4 
 3-years-ahead 311 25.9 37.5 245 21.7 31.5 245 3.6 5.3 
 4-years-ahead 223 43.6 56.5 190 32.2 43.1 190 6.9 10.2 
 5-years-ahead 139 61.0 76.0 123 49.6 59.8 123 10.4 15.3 
 
Panel B:  Annual growth rate in revenues, by key percentiles  
 #obs.      10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   
All historical data 4,143 –5% 8% 48% 143% 418%  
1-year-ahead forecasts 389 7% 46% 112% 246% 660% 
2-year-ahead forecasts 422 29% 72% 164% 384% 951% 
3-year-ahead forecasts 292 40% 71% 111% 169% 299% 
4-year-ahead forecasts 215 29% 49% 77% 112% 176% 
5-year-ahead forecasts 138 19% 37% 57% 88% 113%  
 
Panel C:  Annual growth rate in expenses, by key percentiles  
 #obs.     10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   
All historical data 4,081 –4% 16% 48% 114% 248%  
1-year-ahead forecasts 229 –6% 17% 52% 109% 226% 
2-year-ahead forecasts 264 15% 36% 78% 143% 268% 
3-year-ahead forecasts 226 26% 47% 81% 112% 151% 
4-year-ahead forecasts 181 22% 40% 62% 89% 119% 
5-year-ahead forecasts 122 17% 32% 56% 79% 106%  
 
Panel D:  Net income-to-expense ratio, by key percentiles  
 #obs.      10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   
All historical data 6,143 –100% –84% –34% 0% 8%  
1-year-ahead forecasts 610 –89% –60% –20% 4% 16% 
2-year-ahead forecasts 306 –55% –16% 6% 15% 26% 
3-year-ahead forecasts 245 0% 9% 16% 26% 48% 
4-year-ahead forecasts 190 7% 13% 20% 34% 55% 
5-year-ahead forecasts 123 9% 13% 21% 33% 54%  
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
Panel E:  Regressions of historical profitability measures on industry sector and firm age 
 
The data exclude firm-year observations in the industry sector classified by VentureOne as 
“Other.”  All regressions are estimated without an intercept.  However, the adjusted R2 statistics 
are taken from equivalent regressions that do include an intercept, but excludes one of the 
dummy variables.  Given the directional nature of the predictions made regarding the relative 
sizes of coefficients on the industry dummies, the p-values reported in the bottom part of the 
table are one-tailed.  Two-tailed p-values are shown in [.], while t-statistics are shown in (.). 
  
 
  Econometric method applied  
  Logistic OLS  
  Dependent variable  
 Dummy set to one Ratio of net income 
Determinants: if net income > 0 to expenses  
 
Healthcare/Biotech dummy –2.93 –0.83 
(HB) [< 0.0001] (–70.3) 
Info. Tech. dummy –2.20 –0.60  
(IT) [< 0.0001] (–55.3)  
Retail & Cons/Bus dummy –1.81 –0.48 
(RCB) [< 0.0001] (–32.6) 
Firm age in years 0.22 0.05 
 [< 0.0001] (32.2)  
  
 
# obs. 5,977 5,966 
  
 
OLS adj. R2 0.12 0.22 
Percent condordant 73% n.app. 
  
Pr > F {HB = IT} < 0.0001 < 0.0001  
Pr > F {HB = RCB} < 0.0001 < 0.0001  
Pr > F {IT = RCB} < 0.0001 < 0.0001  
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Table 4 
 
OLS regressions of historical and management forecasted revenues, expenses and net 
income on proposed determinants (Private venture-backed U.S. firms, 1985-2007) 
  
The samples are all venture-backed private firms in VentureOne’s U.S. financial statement 
database satisfying the selection criteria described in table 1.  All figures reported are the means 
of the output obtained from estimating the underlying regression equation separately for each of 
VentureOne’s four industry sectors (Healthcare/Biotech; Information Technology; Retail & 
Cons/Bus Prod/Serv; and Other).  Revenues, expenses and net income are in real terms using the 
CPI pivot point of June 2005.  Intercepts and four state dummies (CA, MA, NY, TX) are 
estimated but for parsimony their parameter estimates are not reported.  Mean t-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
  
 
Panel A:  Historical revenues, expenses and net income (1985-2004) 
  Dependent variable  
Determinants: Revenues Expenses Net Income  
 
Firm age 2.59 –0.40 2.41 –0.59 0.27 0.34 
 (5.8) (–1.9) (4.7) (–2.3)  (3.1) (3.6) 
Positive[dep. variable]  1.18  1.13  1.28 
  lagged one year  (76.2)  (64.4)  (10.4) 
Negative[dep. variable]      0.64 
  lagged one year      (20.4)  
        
Mean adj. R2 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.82 0.03 0.40 
Mean # obs. per regression 1,723 1,103 1,539 1,021 1,539 1,021  
 
 
Panel B:  Forecasted revenues, expenses and net income (1985-2007) 
  Dependent variable  
Determinants: Revenues Expenses Net Income  
 
Firm age 3.70 0.14 3.07 0.07 1.14 0.05 
 (6.7) (0.0) (4.9) (–0.1)  (4.9) (0.6) 
Positive[dep. variable]  1.45  1.39  1.56 
  lagged one year  (39.4)  (35.9)  (15.3) 
Negative[dep. variable]      0.54 
  lagged one year      (3.0)  
        
Mean adj. R2 0.22 0.87 0.10 0.87 0.06 0.61 
Mean # obs. per regression 597 371 372 256 372 256  
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Table 5 
 
Mean percentage management forecast errors for revenues, expenses and profitability, 
by forecasting horizon (Private venture-backed U.S. firms, 1985-2007) 
  
The samples are the venture-backed private firms in VentureOne’s U.S. financial statement 
database that satisfy the selection criteria detailed in table 1.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  
Forecasts are denoted as “1 year ahead”, “2 years ahead”, etc. 
 
As described in detail in section 3.1 of the main text, revenue (expense) forecast errors are 
defined as the difference between managers’ revenue (expense) forecasts and historically-
grounded conditional projections of revenues (expenses), deflated by the latter.  Profitability 
forecast errors are defined as managers’ net income forecasts less historically-grounded 
conditional projections of net income, scaled by historically-grounded conditional projections of 
revenues, where historically-grounded conditional projections of net income is the difference 
between historically-grounded conditional projections of revenues and expenses. 
 
In the minority of cases where the historically-grounded conditional projection of revenue is 
negative, no forecast error is computed; likewise for expenses.  If a forecast error exceeds 
2,500% then the forecast error is excluded in computing the mean forecast error.   
 
The mean forecast error for revenues and expenses is a weighted average, where the weights are 
the inverse of the standard errors of the predicted revenues.  The t-statistics shown in parentheses 
for revenues and expenses are also computed using these same weights.  For profitability 
forecast errors, simple (i.e., unweighted) mean forecast errors and t-statistics are computed. 
 
Results for the industry sector classified by VentureOne as “Other” are not separately tabulated 
due to relatively small numbers of observations, particularly at longer forecasting horizons. 
  
 
 
Panel A: All industry sectors pooled 
 
 Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  
           
Historical data 6,811 –3% (–1.2) 6,149 –1% (–0.5) 6,082 5% (2.4)  
           
 
1 year ahead 1,242 –11% (–2.6) 619 –28% (–6.0) 617 35% (10.6) 
2 years ahead 459 42% (4.2) 306 –5% (–0.8) 303 64% (6.2) 
3 years ahead 305 111% (7.1) 244 25% (2.5) 239 67% (12.0) 
4 years ahead 218 165% (8.4) 189 41% (4.8) 186 85% (9.7) 
5 years ahead 134 212% (7.6) 123 80% (5.7) 121 122% (5.6)  
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Healthcare/Biotech sector only 
  Healthcare/Biotech  
 Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  
           
Historical data 1,967 –3% (–0.5) 1,891 –2% (–0.4) 1,827 8% (1.1)  
           
 
1 year ahead 243 49% (2.9) 149 –12% (–1.6) 148 63% (5.9) 
2 years ahead 98 114% (3.7) 76 32% (1.7) 74 88% (4.4) 
3 years ahead 63 204% (3.9) 56 65% (2.2) 53 113% (5.2) 
4 years ahead 54 278% (4.7) 51 56% (3.0) 49 150% (5.1) 
5 years ahead 41 305% (4.8) 37 106% (3.9) 36 238% (3.5)  
           
 
 
Panel C: Information Technology sector only 
  Information Technology  
 Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  
           
Historical data 3,544 –3% (–1.1) 3,126 –1% (–0.3) 3,126 3% (2.2)  
           
 
1 year ahead 717 –27% (–7.7) 332 –30% (–4.0) 332 26% (3.4) 
2 years ahead 274 28% (2.5) 172 –13% (–1.9) 172 55% (5.5) 
3 years ahead 185 95% (6.7) 141 19% (1.9) 141 62% (16.7) 
4 years ahead 118 142% (7.5) 97 47% (4.2) 97 67% (13.7) 
5 years ahead 65 204% (5.8) 58 88% (4.3) 58 85% (9.0)  
           
 
 
Panel D: Retail & Consumer/Business Products/Services sector only 
  Retail & Consumer/Business Products/Services  
 Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  # obs.    Mean t-stat.  
           
Historical data 1,097 –2% (–0.4) 958 –1% (–0.3) 958 8% (5.9)  
           
 
1 year ahead 253 –41% (–7.4) 122 –54% (–13.2) 122 24% (4.6) 
2 years ahead 71 –47% (–7.0) 44 –59% (–10.1) 44 22% (6.4) 
3 years ahead 42 –22% (–2.0) 35 –49% (–6.9) 35 28% (8.7) 
4 years ahead 34 26% (1.2) 30 –32% (–3.3) 30 47% (6.5) 
5 years ahead 20 3% (0.1) 19 –33% (–2.0) 19 46% (5.0)  
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Table 6 
 
Regressions of management forecast errors in table 5 on industry sector dummies, 
forecasting horizon, firm age, and headquarter state dummies 
(Private venture-backed U.S. firms, 1985-2007) 
  
All regressions are estimated without an intercept.  However, the adjusted R2 statistics are taken 
from equivalent regressions that do include an intercept, but excludes one of the dummy 
variables.  Given the directional nature of the predictions made regarding the relative sizes of 
coefficients on the industry dummies, the p-values reported in the bottom part of the table are 
one-tailed. 
  
 
      Dependent variable   
  Percentage forecast error for:  
Determinants: Revenues Expenses Profitability  
 
Healthcare/Biotech dummy 7% –18% –29% –35% 61% 54% 
(HB) (0.6) (–1.2) (–3.3) (–3.2) (6.5) (4.6) 
Info. Tech. dummy –83% –110% –56% –64% 5% –3% 
(IT) (–9.5) (–8.7) (–8.0) (–6.6) (0.7) (–0.3) 
Retail & Cons/Bus dummy –137% –161% –104% –112% –12% –20% 
(RCB) (–8.9) (–9.2) (–8.7) (–8.4) (–1.2) (–1.6) 
Forecast horizon 57% 54% 26% 25% 19% 18% 
 [no. of years ahead] (16.2) (13.9)  (10.1) (8.8) (7.2) (6.0) 
Firm age  2.3  0.3  0.8 
  (1.6)   (0.2)  (0.6) 
CA headquarter dummy  40%  29%  14% 
  (4.2)  (4.0)  (1.7) 
MA headquarter dummy  18%  –17%  1% 
  (1.2)  (–1.5)  (0.1) 
NY headquarter dummy  13%  –43%  8% 
  (0.5)  (–2.5)  (0.4) 
TX headquarter dummy  –67%  –35%  –17% 
  (–3.1)  (–6.6)  (–0.9) 
  
 
Adj. R2 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.07 
# obs. 2,278 2,278 1,419 1,419 1,410 1,410 
  
 
Pr > F {HB = IT} < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
Pr > F {HB = RCB} < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
Pr > F {IT = RCB} < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.04 0.04 
  
 43
